H. L. A. Hart's famous paper, "The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights," (AWl, '48) is receiving renewed attention because it is found to be the place where the term "defensible" is introduced.l Defensible reasoning has flourished in recent years; some think that its grandest form will be achieved in this community, where logic and law meet.
Hart, however, had critics who have described the worlk as "fraught with difficulties" (Bayles, '92, p.12) , "an abandoned wreck (Howarth, '81, p. 33) , "inconclusive"
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@ 1995 ACM 0-89791-758-8/95/0005/0021 $1.50 famously) declined to reprint the paper in his collection, Punishment and Responsibility, '68. Of the two critics Hart cited, one says of the work: "fundamentally incorrect"
and "needs to be drastically reformulated" (Pitcher, '60, p. 226) ; the other does not even deign to name Hart: "some Oxford philosophers, whom I shall call Ascriptivists, have resorted to denying" descriptive language (Geach, '60, p. 221) . "I shall .. . refute Ascriptivism." Three obscure pages later, the critic announces: "With this, I dismiss Ascnptivism" (Geach, '60, p. 224) .
This daubery of Hart will not stand. The basic idea behind Hart's use of defensibility is praised by his critics who evaluate it.
Hart's notion of defeasibitity seems enormously suggestive and potentially fruitful. It fills our heads with ideas and apparent insights.
It seems to have applications in many areas . The recognition that concepts are defensible, seems a great advance in clarification. (Baker, '77, p. 43) Clearly the full extent of defensibility needs elaboration. The potential .. is considerable. (Howarth, '81, p. 40 Melden, '59, p. 18 gives Ewing, '47, p. 33, and Frankena, '52, p. 196, and '55, p. 231 as references to the use of prima faie, to which we must add Prior, '49, p. viii and Barry, '65 (his '58 dissertation supervised by Hart), pp. 32-4). Hart's defensibility clearly augments Ross's prima facie duties. By the time Chisholm uses the term in '64, "These questions concern: the 'defeasibility' of moral requirements ...." (Chisholm, '64a, p. 147) the attribution of its original use seems no longer necessary. Chisholm says that his colleague, John Ladd, "who was quite taken by Hart," had used the term (personal communication), and Ladd cites Hart, Ross, and Chisholm liberally in his early work. Ladd later adds, "... I, at one time, held a view close to that of Hart, but the study of Navaho ethics convinced me that it was untenable [Ladd cites a section of the book that was unprinted]." (Ladd, '57, p. 462 ) Chisholm reviews Hart that same year, "Similarly for ... those facts which would defeat the ascription of killing." (Chisholm, ' 64b, p. 614) Also Fkth, "Their warrant is not derived from . coherence nor defensible . ..." (Fkth, '64, p. 552) Swain, Sosa, and Lehrer-Prrxson show how the term became mainstream in epistemology in the mid-' 7tYs, especially with Pollock (although Pollock communicated to me that he came to defensibility by expounding Wittgenstein, as did Hart) , and also mainstream in the philosophy of practical reasoning (e.g., Searle, Nozick, Raz, and Audi) . From there it was imported to AI work on non-monotonic reasoning (see Doyle, '80, Nute, ('85) '88, Loui, '87, Causey, '91; Causey cites Belzer, who cites Nozick) . A problem with defeasibility's use in epistemology is that it is so closely connected to "fallibility" and "corrigibility". In AI, we return to Hart's original problem of specifiirzg rules and applying them. assigns responsibility. 1. At a soccer game for children, a nine-year old runs into an eight-year old on the opposing team.
Neither is particularly coordinated, and the eight-year old leaps up, claiming "he hh me." There is a rule against "hitting" in this league, and one who "hhs" must leave the game for five minutes. The referee says calmly. "he didn't hit you: he just bumped into you," because agreeing that there was a hitting would require penalizing the nine-year old.
2. Melden describes Hart's proposal as "drastic." (Melden, '56, p. 532 ) But Melden seems to agree with Hart: Hart's proposal is only "more drastic" than what Melden puts forth. 3. Note how Pollock uses "ascribe" even before he comes to use "defeasible":
"To ascribe the concept 'bird' to an object must mean simply to . . . judge that it is a bird." (Pollock, '67, 4. Interestingly, no one disputes the intermediate thesis, that "This is his" is ascriptive just as Hart contends.
2.
In an inflexible computer system for automatically billing airfare to accounts, there is a rule of inference that says that the "purchaser" of tickets is billed for their full cost. This rule functions as a meaning postulate of the language in which knowledge is represented.
To have one's name entered as the purchaser is to be charged, in the same non-ampliative way that attribution of bachelorhood is supposed to require attribution of mate gender for proficient speakers of English. A customer interacting with the system correctly resists saying that he is "purchasing" a ticket, when he tickets a flight with a half-price voucher. First, by a denial of the facts upon which they are based and secondly by something quite different, namely a plea that although all the circumstances on which a claim could succeed are present, yet in the particular case, the claim .. . should not succeed because other circumstances are present which brings the case under some recognized head of exception, the effect of which is either to defeat the claim . .. altogether, or to "reduce" it .. . . (AI?R, 5. This qualification, though noticed by many critics, is not respected in their attacks. For instance, in Geach, Pitcher, Feinberg, and Howarth. In order to debate primary versus secondmy use, we must first adopt a speech actor illocutionary point of view; having adopted such a view, the issue really turns on how one chooses to describe the conventions of the language's community of users. Searle has it this way: "... Counterexamples can be produced of ordinary uses of the word 'promise' which do not fit the analysis.
. Their existence does not 'refute' the analysis, rather they require an explanation of why and how they depart from the paradigm cases of promise makhg." (Searle, '69, p.55) Here and in the next paragraphs, one can see in Hart all of the depth and clarity of understanding of argument which made Stephen Toulmin famous in his '58 work.
Hart's most famous passage in this paper introduces the term, defensibility:
When the student has learnt that in English law there are positive conditions required for the existence of a valid contract, .. . he has still to learn what can defeat a claim that there is a valid contract, even though all these conditions are satisfied. The student has still to learn what can follow on the word "unless", which should accompany the statement of these conditions. This characteristic of legal concepts is one for which no word exists in ordinary English. . .. The law has a word which with some hesitation I borrow and extend this is the word "defensible", used of a legal interest in property which k subject to termination or "defeat" in a number of different contingencies but remains intact if no such contingencies mature.
In this sense, then, contract is a defensible concept. (ARR, p. 152) III. Critics.
Geach.
The entire text of Geach's main argument is exactly this:
Now as regards hundreds of voluntary or intentional acts, it would in fact be absurdly solemn, not to say melodramatic, to talk of imputation and exoneration and excuse, or for that matter of praise and reward.
Ascribing an action to an agent just does not in general mean taking up a quasi-legal or quasi-moral attitude, and only a bad choice of examples could make one think otherwise. (Geach, '60, p What is being attempted . .. is to account for the use of a term "P" concerning a thing as being a performance of some other nature than describing the thing. But what is regularly ignored is the distinction between calling a thing "P" and predicating "P" of a thing. "P" may still be predicated of the thing even in a sentence used nonassertively as a clause within another sentence. .
Hence6
, calling a thing "P" has to be explained in terms of predicating "P' of a thing, not the other way round. (Geach, '60, p ... Had I commanded ... the seminal distinction between the "meaning" and the "force" of utterances, I should not have claimed that statements .. . were not "descriptive" .. . . (Hart, '83, p. 2; see also pp. 4-5) Defensible reasoning and logical assertion are compatible.
The way for conventional logicians like Geach to understand what has happened is to consider the difference between 1. P(a); 2. "P(a)"; 3. "P(a)" is true; 4. "P(a)" is probable; 5.
is accepted inductively;
6. "P(a)" is defensibly warranted; 7. "P(a)" is adjudged.
6. Geach's "hence" is purely rhetorical, since non-assertorial predications might be explained in some other way (e.g., Hare, '70). 7. Feinberg makes this point too "Philosophers who contrast 'ascriptive' with 'factual' .. . have this distinction in mind [:] By 'ascriptive sentences' they mean sentences not wholly theoretical or factual, having an irreducibly discretionary aspect. " (Feinberg, '65, p. 151) 8. Here, P(a) and R(a) are not to he confused with "genuine action plus its intended effects," which Hart dismisses (ARR, p. 164). R is like the penalty or reward accrued for P, or at least a liability for it, if it were to exist. I would further suggest that the implication of R(a) from P(a) is defensible, which is the current practice among researchers on discourse, e.g., Lascarides and Oberlander, '92.
The first is an assertion in the object-language. The second is not an assertion; it is a term in the metalanguage.
The rest are assertions in the meta-language.
When we state the logical conundrum with this precision, Geach and Hart are easily reconciled. Hart is saying that for some sentences, the best we can achieve is (6).
Of course, some say that (4) is the best we can achieve empirically; they deny the force of induction,
. (4) through (7) and modifying the concept, "'A X-cd in manner M' is true".
. The sorts of claim which defeat the application of legal concepts to given situations do nothing of the sort in the case of action concepts. (Cherry, '74, p. 101) That A did X by accident . . presupposes that A did X. (Cherry, '74, p. 106) Hart appears to hold that "A X-cd in manner M" sometimes is incompatible with "A X-cd" simpliciter. Cherry gives a counterexample:
. .. There is nothing conceptually odd about saying "He is playing chess, although he's being forced to do so at pistolPoint". (Cherry, '74, p. 103) Let us assume M = "at pistol point" and X = "to play chess". "A X-cd in manner M and "A X-cd" indeed seem compatible. This is a problem for the defense of Hart (Hart, '68, pp. 210ff .) Feinberg too: "... We rnigbt say he is properly subject --or liable --to blame, and then judgment could be characterized as an ascription of liability," (Fehtberg, '70, p. 128) And in Kaufmann, "... Q 'uil s 'agit ici ... de la responsibility au sens de <<liability> . ... (Kaufmann, '84, p. 10) 10. Melden sees the subtlety, too. (Melden, '56, A second response is that the conventional connection between playing chess and being liable for any punishment for doing so is tigh~so tight, that one is reluctant to say This is consistent with a careful reading of Hart's paper's third section.
Cherry raises a further problem that concerns 11. It seems clear Hart cared deeply about such things, going so far as to consider the argument "We are Germans; they are Jews" (Hart, '55, p. 190) . McCormick details Hart's "hostility to Fascism," his "helping refugees from Nazi Germany during the ' 30s," his birth in '07 "of Jewish parents": " [Hart] 's political beliefs .. . took no public form until after the war. ... Their importance for an appreciation of hi~while achievement as a jurist must not be underestimated.
To be fully aware of this is essential as a prelude to considering .. . his analytical work." (McCormick, "81, In order for there to exist a class of defensible concepts there must exist a broader class of concepts which are not similarly defensible . .. . (Cherry, '74, p. 106) .,. It is impossible to present in a logically coherent form what in our conceptual set-up are defeating claims, for the conditions essential to their derivation .. . are ex hypothesi lacking. (Cherry, '74, p. 107) It is fair to say that Hart did not depict defensibility, . It is unclear that [Hart] rejects the analysis of defensible concepts itself, as opposed to the claim that human action is the ascription of such a concept. (Bayles, '92, p. 12)
Hart hardly can be said to disavow defensibility in this passage from "Legal responsibility and excuses" which he did select to appear in Punishment and Responsibility:
Most of the mental conditions we have mentioned are . .. recognized by the law as important not primarily as excusing conditions but as invalidating conditions. Thus a will, a gift, a marriage, and (subject to many complex exceptions) a contract may be invalid if the party concerned was insane, mistaken about the legal character of the transaction, or some "essential" term of it, or if he was subject to duress, coercion, or the undue influence of other persons. There are obvious analogues of mistake, accident, coercion, duress, insanity, which are admitted by criminal law as excusing conditions. (Hart, '68 ('58) 12. Hart does return to the word, matter-of-factly: "So my argument will not show that men have any right which is 'absolute,' 'indefeasible,' or 'imprescriptible.'" (Hart, '55, p. 176 ) Hart chooses to speak of "invalidating" rather than "defeating" conditions. This would be to call concepts "invalidable".
The latter word has even better connotations than "ttefeasible."
O.@ord U. English Dictionary has: "defensible, 1586; capable of being undone, defeated, or made void, as a d. estate. " Meanwhile: "invdida$w,~~.~mder~f 110fc.r~e cm~ffv~t, SSP,tv depriye, vf legal efficacy. To i. an obligation, 1651, an argument, 1674, evidence, 1801. " Sadly, though, it has for "invalidable" the connotation, "ineffective." Also, from logic, "invalid" implies that a rule has a truth status, even though "invalidated" is the intended stative. Chisholm used "overridden" and "may be overridden."
(Chisholm, '64a, p. 148) Sosa used "discredits." (Sosa, '91 ('64) , p. 16). Klein uses the term "disqualifying" (Klein, '71, p. 475 ). Nozick introduces a bev y: "undercut, out weighted, neutralized, overcome, overshadowed, dissolved, canceled, consent-weakened, destroyed, nullified, undermined, upset, precluded." (Nozick, '68, p. 29ff) Hart simply declined to "press the view."
Bayles gives defensibility short-shrift:
. Hart also seems to have thought that it was impossible to formulate all the exceptions in advance. (Bayles, '92, p. 12; see Hart, '61, p. 123, and '83 ('70), In the language of the writers on nonmonotonic reasoning, one might say that Hart understood the qualification problem: formulating rules that mention all possible exceptions is difficult, and defensibility makes formulation easier.
... Indeterminacy springs from the fact that it is impossible in framing general rules to anticipate and provide for every possible combination of circumstances which the future may bring. (Hart '83 ('67), p. 103) 13. Hart almost certainly was inspired by Bentbam's distinction between "positive" and "negative acts." Bentham: "... The nature vf sm w.x, whczhcr pcmitiye or ncgatimz, ifi not to bc drmxmincxt immediately by the form of the discourse used to express it. An act which is positive in its nature may be characterized by a negative expression. Thus, not to be at rest, is as much as to say to move. So also an act, which is negative in its nature, may be characterized by a positive expression: thus, to forbear or omit to bring food to a person is signified by the single and positive term to . . . Hart greatly exaggerates the heterogeneity of tbe defences against the claim that there is a contract.
. . . l[n ordinary practice, lawyers may treat "consent" as the mere absence of the various defences; but on the rare occasions when a higher court has to make a new decision, surely the judges do . .. consider, as a real question, whether the new defence is or is not evidence of the absence of consent. . . . ... It is not that the absence of intention is a defence; it is rather that the presence of intention establishes a prirn!a facie case for the prosecution. (Mackie, '55, p. 154) This passage from Mackie nearly concedes Hart his point.
However, Mackie implores us not to conclude too mucht ... The linguistic philosopher need not get stuck in "vicious linguisticism"; . . he must observe how things really are. . .. Hart is failing to do this; . he is using the evidence of linguistics] as if it showed conclusively ... the facts .. . .
,,, Because we use the word "intention" defensibly, intention must be a purely defensible concept, there cannot be a positive psychological state .. . called intending.
But this argument is . no more valid than the argument .. .. .. . since there is a word "intention" there must be a thing to which it refers. (Mackie, '56, p. 157 (Feinberg, '65, p. 136) Oddly, Feinberg finds some use for the "vague though not necessarily obscure" concept of defensibility: He can be found distinguishing defensible from non-defensible charges (Feinberg, '65, p. 139) , qualifying his new concept of "registrability" as defensible (Feinberg, '65, p. 141) , and counting many imputations of fault as defensible (Feinberg, '65, p. 147) . In fact, his abstract describes his agreement with Hart over the part of the original analysis that "has the greatest prima facie plausibility" (Feinberg, '65, p. 134) . We could consider it a playful use of words if
Feinberg did not have to rely on the concept so sincerely and repeatedly throughout his own analysis.
Baker later reiterates Feinberg's point:
Given the procedural rules for English law, we can determine . the burden of proof . . . Outside courtrooms there are no similar rules to settle questions of onus of proof. This obstructs the extension of the concept of defensibility to any non-legal concepts; in particular to the concept of human action. (Baker, '77, p. 33) [Hart] requires the elaboration of a non-legal notion of onus of proof ... . (Baker, '77, p. IV.3. Baker.
The problem for defensibility, Baker correctly sees, is the concept of meaning based on truth-conditions:
It is impossible to marry the concept of defeasibility with our conception of meaning based on truth-conditions . . (Baker, '77, p. 43) Baker then describes a possible framework for defensible reasoning:
We might expect to find the defensibility to have implications for the structure of . arguments. A decision should be reached solely on the basis of evidence actually submitted by at least one of the parties or implicitly What is really amazing is that Hart was able to cover so much novel logical ground in such a short essay. Even considering Hart's intellectual magnitude, this requires explanation.
As Totrlmin18 and I have noted, those working "in the borderland between jurisprudence and philosophy" have advantages over philosophical logicians.
IV.4. Howarth.
If defensibility is a good idea, how has it survived in the law of contract? Does it remain the organizing principle of the law of contract? Howarth thinks yes. Hart felt he made errors, but those same errors did not prevent him from including "Definition and theory in jurisprudence" in his later collection.
So why did Hart "decline" to reprint it?
Why" did he never return to "defensible concepts"? I believe Hart found that there were more important things to do than to debate closed--minded logicians. Hart decided to be a philosopher of law, a great philosopher of law, rather than be a foctnote beneath the footprint of deductivist dogma.
Shortly after Hart's fray with demonstrative logicians, Hart published "A logician's fairy tale": What accounts for ... failure is ... the incautious assumption that the methods of logical analysis, the principles of logical classification, and the symbolic notation which have 18. "It is probably no accident that [Hart] reached these results while working in the borderland between jurisprudence and philosophy." (Touhnin, '58, p. 142) 19. Mackie makes this point with contempt for its very suggestion: "... the notion of a lower degree of responsibility is i] confused one ,.. . What must be meant is that there is full responsibility for a less wrong act." (Mackie, 1955, p. 155) been so fruitful and so clarifying in the treatment of mathematical or other systems of necessary truth can safely be used ... in the elucidation of the non-necessary propositions of ordinary discourse. And since in modem manuals of logic this assumption determines the whole presentation of the subject, it is worth examining a single case where, as it seems to me, it calamitously breaks down, especially as a moral may be drawn for other cases where also the obviously valuable apparatus of modem logic seems not to clarify but to distort. (Hart, '60, p. 198) In making this criticism I am not contending for a third truth value, a "multi-valued' logic . .. .20 I am on the contrary defending a feature of ordinary speech against a formal logician's prejudice which has blinded authors as accurate as these . . These are parting words from one who has grown tired of his adversary. Hart then introduced Perelman's translated papers, The Idea of Justice and The Problem of Argument ('63):
The connection between law and the study of argument ... is . clear. Legal reasoning characteristically depends on precedent and analogy, and makes ao appeal less to universal logical principles than to certain basic assumptions peculiar to the lawye~it therefore offers the clearest . .. example of modes of persuasion which are rational and yet not in the logical sense conclusive . .. .21 (Perelman (Hart) , '63, p. vii) Hart refers to Perelman's use of argument:
... argument which made appeal to those "proofs" which Aristotle characterised as dialectical in contrast to the analytic proofs of formal logic. (Perelman (Hart) , '63, p. vii) Hart would leave the fracas and let others join the fight.22
Hart is content to make claims about "action in law," and embittered to attack traditional logicians indirectly, e.g. (Hart, '83 ('53), p. 40 and '83 ('70) , p. 265-6).
Logicians think it heresy to think there might be other formal systems of representation.
They drove Keynes to economics and Hart to jurisprudence, refusing to receive the largess of each.
I don't believe Hart's conception of defensibility was perfect. Today, we emphasize the defensibility of rules, not the defensibility of concepts defined through defensible rules. Hart's claiming the impossibility of necessary and sufficient conditions needs to be made more precise; 23 consideã confract exists i$arzd onlyt here was a contracting and it was effective. 20. I have omitted from Hart the phrase: "or the introduction of any sophisticated formal principle".
A response to my paper can point here to claim that defensibility, a formal principle introduced by Hart, is thus repudiated. But I think the emphasis on "words" like "unless" is consistent with adherence to defeasibility, which could as easily be "a feature of ordinary speech." 21. Hart continues, "This was not . . . mere style . ..." which I also argue (Loui, '91) , contra Alchourron. 22. Hart later comes to use Perelman's word, "argument", which is conspicuously absent in the rest of his writing: "what is needed is .. . reasoned argument directed to establishing the merits of conflicting theories, [or] divergent concepts or rules .. . ," (Hart, '83, p. 6) This cartoons the issue, but it does provide necessary and sufficient conditions, trivially, by remigrating the 24 Will Hart's defensibility needs no major defensibility. , updating to fit today's formal work.
To follow Hart, we should all aspire to elucidate great themes, rather than to participate in small rows. Why such a detailed revisiting of this old paper?
Because Hart's ideas have been wronged and deserve to be restored. Every time we formalize another aspect of representation and reasoning, we learn how right Hart was.
